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ABSTRACT
We demonstrate that Non-Maximum Suppression (NMS), which is
commonly used in Object Detection (OD) tasks to filter redundant
detection results, is no longer secure. Considering that NMS has
been an integral part of OD systems, thwarting the functionality
of NMS can result in unexpected or even lethal consequences for
such systems. In this paper, we propose an adversarial example
attack which triggers malfunctioning of NMS in end-to-end OD
models. Our attack, namely Daedalus, compresses the dimensions
of detection boxes to evade NMS. As a result, the final detection
output contains extremely dense false positives. This can be fatal
for many OD applications such as autonomous vehicle and surveil-
lance system. Our attack can be generalised to different end-to-end
OD models, such that the attack cripples various OD applications.
Furthermore, we propose a way to craft robust adversarial examples
by using an ensemble of popular detection models as the substitutes.
Considering the pervasive nature of model reusing in real-world
OD scenarios, Daedalus examples crafted based on an ensemble of
substitutes can launch attacks without knowing the parameters of
the victim models. Our experiments demonstrate that the attack
effectively stops NMS from filtering redundant bounding boxes. As
the evaluation results suggest, Daedalus increases the false positive
rate in detection results to 99.9% and reduces the mean average
precision scores to 0, while maintaining a low cost of distortion on
the original inputs. With the widespread applications of OD, our
work shows that there are serious vulnerabilities in the fundamen-
tal components of such systems and further investigation on them
is required in this area.
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Figure 1: A demo of the Daedalus attack on YOLO-v3. The
upper-left image is an original image taken from COCO
dataset [31]. The OD results are shown in the upper-right
image. An adversarial example as well as the OD results of
the adversarial example are shown in the second row. The
adversarial example significantly increases the number of
final detection boxes after NMS andmakes the detector non-
viable. However, the perturbation on the adversarial exam-
ple is still imperceptible.
1 INTRODUCTION
Object Detection (OD) is a fundamental operation in the field of
computer vision and is repeatedly used in the areas of autonomous
vehicles, robotics, surveillance system, and biometric authentica-
tions. Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) is embedded in the
core of many state-of-the-art OD models. These models can be clas-
sified into two broad categories: single-stage detection models (e.g.
SSD [33], RetinaNet [30], You-Only-Look-Once (YOLO)[47], YOLO-
9000 [48], and YOLO-v3 [49]) and two-stage detection models (e.g.
R-CNN [15] and Fast R-CNN [14]). Single-stage ones have become
successful since they perform end-to-end detection which has low
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computational overhead and is competitively accurate. Current end-
to-end detection models are mostly built upon Fully Convolutional
Network (FCN) backbones. However, FCNs output a large number
of redundant detection results that shall be filtered before the final
results are produced.
To filter the redundant detection boxes, Non-Maximum Suppres-
sion (NMS) is performed as a key step in the OD procedure [43].
NMS has been an integral component in many OD algorithms for
around 50 years. It relies on non-differentiable, hard-coded rules to
discard redundant boxes. It is used in both single-stage and two-
stage detection algorithms. Beyond OD, NMS is also being used
in face recognition, face verification and keypoint detection [50].
NMS has also inspired refinement algorithms in two-stage detec-
tion models [6]. Some recent works tried to use a differentiable
model to learn NMS [22–24, 46]. Another work suggested using
soft-NMS to improve the filtering performance [3]. Therefore, NMS
is very important to OD systems, once the NMS component in an
OD system does not work properly, the system fails.
CNN is known to be vulnerable to adversarial example attacks
[1]. To a human eye, an adversarial image can be indistinguishable
from the original one, but it can cause misclassification in a CNN
based classifier. Recently, an adversarial example has been crafted
for OD and segmentation tasks [58]. This attack follows the same
principles as the ones that craft adversarial examples for classifiers.
Such attacks on detection models, result in the misclassification of
the detected objects. All the above adversarial examples attack by
triggering misclassification in the victim models. Thus, we refer to
these examples as misclassification adversarial examples. However,
false positive rate is another critical metric in OD missions such
as pedestrian detection [13] and military object recognition [60].
Therefore, an attack that boosts the false positive rate of an OD
system is as lethal as the misclassification adversarial examples.
In this paper, we propose a novel adversarial example attack for
NMS, which can be universally applied to any other end-to-end
differentiable OD model. A demonstration of our attack is shown in
Fig.1. As it can be seen, a properly crafted adversarial example can
trigger malfunctioning of the NMS component in YOLO-v3, in a
way that it outputs dense and noisy detection results. We name this
attack Daedalus since it creates a maze composed of false positive
detection results.
We first evaluate and analyse how Daedalus reduces the OD
performance by breaking NMS1. Furthermore, Daedalus is adapted
for launching black-box attack. Based on a census in Section 2.2, we
observe two facts: 1) current OD tasks are thriving on a few types
of OD models, even many models have been proposed; 2) current
OD tasks often load trained parameters into a model instead of
reparameterising the model. Therefore, if an attacker can generate
an universal adversarial example which works effectively against all
the popular models, the example has a high chance to successfully
sabotage a black-box model. Herein, we propose using an ensemble
of substitutes (i.e., an ensemble of popular detection models as the
substitutes) in Daedalus attack to break the black-box OD models.
We exploit the latest version of YOLO (i.e. YOLO-v3 [49]), SSD [33],
and RetinaNet [30] as the victims. As suggested by our experiments,
1In this paper, the term breaking NMS means that NMS cannot filter redundant bound-
ing boxes detected from an adversarial example.
universal Daedalus examples generated by using an ensemble of
popular OD models can launch attacks in a black-box scenario. In
brief, we summarise our contributions as follows:
• We propose a novel adversarial example attack which aims
at breaking NMS (unlike the existing state-of-the art attacks
that merely target misclassification). As a consequence, the
attack creates a large number of false positives in the detection
results;
• We propose new adversarial loss functions to generate NMS
adversarial examples. We further propose an ensemble-of-
substitutes attack that generates robust adversarial examples
which can make NMS malfunction in multiple models, simul-
taneously. In such way, we can partially convert black-box
attacks to white-box attacks;
• We adopt two adaptive defences aiming to mitigate the attack.
We evaluate our attack and show that it is effective against the
state-of-the-art OD models with/without the defences.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the back-
ground knowledge of adversarial example, object detection, and
NMS. Section 3 describes the design of Daedalus attack. Section
4 compares and selects loss functions from the candidates, and
systematically evaluates the performance of our attack. Section 5
discusses the possibility of applying Daedalus adversarial exam-
ples on soft-NMS, RetinaNet, and black-box models. We also post
the dilemma of defending against Daedalus attack in this section.
Section 6 reviews the related work relevant to our study. Section 7
draws a conclusion on the paper and presents our future work.
2 PRELIMINARY
2.1 Adversarial examples
Given a DNN model F and a benign data example x , an attacker
can craft an adversarial examples of x by altering the features of x
by adding a perturbation δ , such that F (x + δ ) , F (x). Generating
adversarial examples can be interpreted as optimising the examples
features towards adversarial objectives. Gradients-based optimi-
sation methods are commonly employed to search for adversarial
examples. The optimisation objective can be generally parsed as
follows:
argmin
δ
|δ |p + c · L(F (x + δ ),y) (1)
s .t . x + δ ∈ [0, 1]n ,
wherein , L is an adversarial objective set by the attacker, and y is
either a ground truth output or a desired adversarial output for F .
x + δ produces an adversarial example xadv . |δ |p is the allowed
distortion bounded by the p-norm of δ . A constant c is adopted to
balance the adversarial loss and the distortion. This box-constrained
non-convex optimisation problem is typically solved by gradient
descent methods.
2.2 A census of object detection models
To better understand the impact of attacks against OD tasks, we
first need to overview the distribution of models used in OD. We
conducted a census of OD projects on Github. We crawled project
names, project descriptions, and readme files from 1, 696OD-related
2
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Table 1: Object detection Models on Github
Rank Model Popularity
1 SSD 605
2 YOLO-v3 251
3 Faster R-CNN 236
4 R-CNN 178
5 YOLO-v2 164
6 RetinaNet 75
7 YOLO-v1 52
Popular models/Total 1,561/1,696
repositories on Github. Next, based on the reviewed models in [32],
45 released OD models were selected as keywords. For each reposi-
tory, we counted the keywords in the readme file, and selected the
most frequent one as the model adopted for the repository. Finally,
we grouped the repositories by models. The ranking of models
that appeared more than 50 times is presented in Table 1. Based
on our analysis, 1, 561 out of 1, 696 repositories use models from
Table 1. The observation suggests that models and backbones used
for OD tasks are highly limited in number. Moreover, we analysed
the source codes from the repositories to search for operations of
loading trained models and parameters. We observed that almost
all the source codes provide an interface for loading pre-trained pa-
rameters into the model backbones. We further investigated names
of the pre-trained models and parameters. We found that many
repositories use the same pre-tained parameters in their models.
Based on the observations, black-box attacks towards ODmodels
can be partially converted to white-box attacks. An attacker can first
craft a universal adversarial example which breaks all the popular
white-box ODmodels, and then launch attacks on black-box models
using the example. The attack has a high potential to break the
black-box models since that the black-box models may have the
same parameters with the white-box models.
2.3 Object detection
Given an input frame, an end-to-end OD model outputs detected
regression boxes and classification probabilities through a FCN.
Herein, we adopt the third version of You Only Look Once detector
(YOLO) [47] as an example to introduce the kownledge of end-to-
end detection algorithms. YOLO has achieved the state-of-the-art
performance on standard detection tasks such as PASCAL VOC
[11] and COCO [31]. Over the past years, YOLO has been updated
to YOLO-v2/YOLO-9000 [48], and the current YOLO-v3 [49]. YOLO
has been applied in video OD [52] and robotics [36]. YOLO has
been studied extensively in the research of road sign detection and
recognition for autonomous car [61].
The backbone of YOLO-v3 is a 53-layer FCN (i.e. Darknet-53).
YOLO-v3 segments the input image using three mesh grids in differ-
ent scales (i.e., 13×13, 26×26, 52×52). The model outputs detection
on these three scales. Each grid contains three anchor boxes, whose
dimensions are obtained by K-means clustering on the dimensions
of ground truth bounding boxes. Each grid outputs three bound-
ing box predictions. Henceforth, there are totally 10647 bounding
boxes in the output of YOLO-v3. The Darknet-53 backbone outputs
a feature map which contains bounding box parameters, box confi-
dence, and object class probabilities. Specifically, for each bounding
box, the feature map includes its height th , width tw , center coor-
dinates (tx , ty ), as well as class probabilities p1,p2, ...,pn and the
objectness t0. t0 is the confidence that a box contains an object.
Given the feature map, the position of each detection box is then
calculated based on anchor box dimension priors pw and ph , and
centre offsets (cx , cy ) from the top-left corner of the image. The
final box dimension and position will then be:
bx = cx + θ (tx )
by = cy + θ (ty ) (2)
bw = pwe
tw
bh = phe
th
Herein, bw is the box width, and bh is the box height. bx and by
are the box center coordinates. The box confidence b0 is calculated
as:
b0 = t0 ·max{p1,p2, ...,pn } (3)
YOLO-v3 finally outputs the bounding boxes, the box confi-
dences, and the class probabilities. The outputs will then be pro-
cessed by NMS to generate the final detection results.
2.4 Non-Maximum Suppression (NMS)
NMS is integrated into OD algorithms to filter detection boxes.
NMS makes selections based on the Intersection over Union (IoU)
between detection boxes. IoU measures the ratio of the overlapped
area over the union area between two boxes. NMS works in two
steps: 1) For a given object category, all of the detected bounding
boxes in this category (i.e., candidate set) are sorted based on their
box confidence scores from high to low; 2) NMS selects the box
which has the highest box confidence score as the detection result,
and then it discards other candidate boxes whose IoU value with the
selected box is beyond the threshold. Then, within the remaining
boxes, NMS repeats the above two steps until there is no remaining
box in the candidate set. Suppose the initial detection boxes are
B = b1,b2, ...,bn , the corresponding box confidence scores are
S = s1, s2, ..., sn . Given an NMS threshold Nt , we can write the
NMS algorithm as Algorithm 1:
Algorithm 1: Non-Maximum Suppression
Input: B , S , Nt
Initialisation:
D ← {}
while B , empty do
m ← argmax S
M ← bm
D ← D ∪ B
B ← B −M
for bi ∈ B do
if IoU (M, bi ) ≥ Nt then
B ← B − bi
S ← S − si
Output: D , S .
3
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We can observe from the Algorithm 1 that NMS recursively
discards the redundant detection boxes from the raw detection
proposals B, until all raw proposals have been processed.
3 DAEDALUS ATTACK
We introduce our attack, namely Daedalus, in this section. To clarify
the intuition behind the attack, we first analyse the vulnerability
that we exploit to break NMS. Then, we introduce the general
optimisation techniques used for making adversarial examples.
Subsequently, we propose a series of adversarial loss functions
to optimise in order to generate Daedalus adversarial examples. At
last, we assemble the algorithms together to present the Daedalus
attack, which can force a detection network to output an adversarial
feature map that causes the malfunctioning of NMS.
3.1 Attacking NMS
We first introduce the vulnerability, which enables our attack, in
NMS. NMS filters boxes based on the IoU between boxes. Specifi-
cally, after the raw detection boxes are obtained, the boxes with a
confidence score below a given threshold will be discarded. Next,
for a given object class and a box of this class with the highest box
confidence score (i.e., the final detection box), NMS will discard
other remaining boxes based on their IoUs with the final detection
box. This mechanism makes NMS vulnerable to attacks that sup-
press the IoUs between output bounding boxes. Once the IoUs are
suppressed below the required threshold for NMS filtering, NMS
can no longer function normally. In this case, most of the redundant
bounding boxes will be kept in the final detection results.
We consider three elemental schemes to break NMS. First, for
algorithms such as YOLO-v3, it is necessary to make most of the
bounding boxes survive the first round of filtering that discards
boxes based on the box confidences. Hence, we need tomaximise the
box confidences. Second, to compress the IoUs, we can directly min-
imise the IoU for each pair of boxes. Alternatively, we can minimise
the expectation of the box dimension over all the bounding boxes,
and maximise the expectation of the Euclidean distance between
box centres over all pairs of boxes. The schemes are illustrated in
Fig.2.
3.2 Generating adversarial example
We denote a benign example as x . An adversarial example of x is
denoted as x ′. The adversarial perturbation is δ = x ′−x . Therefore,
the distortion calculated based on p-norm of the perturbation is
∥δ ∥p . We can then formulate the attack as the following optimisa-
tion problem:
argmin
δ
∥δ ∥p + c · f (x + δ ) (4)
s .t . x + δ ∈ [0, 1]n ,
wherein, f is an adversarial loss function. We will later select f
from the loss functions presented in the previous section. c is a
constant to balance the distortion and the adversarial loss f . δ is
the adversarial perturbation. An adversary optimises δ to search for
an adversarial example whose pixel values are bounded between
0 and 1. This is a typical box-constraint optimisation problem. To
Figure 2: The schemes we used to attack NMS. The scheme
on the left side directly minimises IoUs between all box
pairs. The second scheme takes a low-cost approximation
of the first scheme. It minimises the dimension for all boxes,
and maximises the Euclidean distance between box centres
for all boxes.
bound the pixel values of the generated adversarial examples be-
tween 0 and 1, we adopt the idea of changing variables from the
paper [5]. We change the optimisation variables from δ to ω. There
are different functions we can use for changing the variables (e.g.
sigmoid function, arctan function, hyperbolic tangent function etc.).
Among these functions, the hyperbolic tangent function generally
produces higher gradients than others. Henceforth, to make the
optimisation converge faster, we select the hyperbolic tangent func-
tion to change the variables. For δi in δ , we can apply a hyperbolic
tangent function such that:
δi =
1
2 (tanh(ωi ) + 1) − xi . (5)
We then optimise the above task based on the new variables
ω. We apply binary search to find the best c during the optimisa-
tion. Finally, the adversarial perturbation δ can be calculated easily
through the inverse of function 5.
3.3 Adversarial loss functions
In this section, we design loss functions that are used to find ad-
versarial examples, which trigger malfunctioning of NMS. Based
on the discussion in Section.3.1, we formulate our attack into three
potential adversarial loss functions. We will evaluate each loss
function in Section.4. There are totally n detection boxes (e.g.,
n = 10647 in YOLO-v3). Supposing the object detector can be
regarded as a function F . Given an input image x , the outputs are
F (x) = {Bx ,By ,Bw ,Bh ,B0, P}. Herein, Bx = {bx0 ,bx1 , ...,bxn }, By =
{by0 ,b
y
1 , ...,b
y
n }, Bw = {bw0 ,bw1 , ...,bwn }, and Bh = {bh0 ,bh1 , ...,bhn }.
They are the dimensions and coordinates of the n output bound-
ing boxes. B0 = {b00 ,b01 , ...,b0n } are the objectness scores and P ={p0,p1, ...,pn } are the class probabilities as introduced in Section
2.3.
Our attack can specify an object classified as category λ to attack.
If we want to attack multiple object categories, we can include these
categories in a set Λ. Based on the above discussion, we define three
loss functions, f1, f2, and f3, as follows:
4
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f1 =
1
∥Λ∥
∑
λ∈Λ
E
i :arдmax (pi )=λ
{[b0i ·max(pi ) − 1]2+ (6)
E
j :arдmax (pj )=λ
IoUi j },
f2 =
1
∥Λ∥
∑
λ∈Λ
E
i :arдmax (pi )=λ
{[b0i ·max(pi ) − 1]2+ (7)
(b
w
i · bhi
W × H )
2 + E
j :arдmax (pj )=λ
1
(bxi − bxj )2 + (b
y
i − b
y
j )2
},
f3 =
1
∥Λ∥
∑
λ∈Λ
E
i :arдmax (pi )=λ
{[b0i ·max(pi ) − 1]2+ (8)
(b
w
i · bhi
W × H )
2},
wherein, IoUi j is the IoU between the i-th and the j-th bounding
boxes. Box dimensions are scaled between 0 and 1, dividing bw and
bh by the input image widthW and height H , such that the term is
invariant towards changing input dimension.
In f1, we first minimise the expectation of mean squared error
between the box confidence and 1 for all the boxes in which the
detected objects are in the attacked category set Λ. Henceforth, the
boxes will not be discarded due to low box confidence scores. In the
second term, f1 minimises the expectation of IoUs for all pairs of
bounding boxes in Λ. When the IoUs fall below the NMS threshold,
the boxes can evade the NMS filter. Alternatively, we minimise the
expectation of box dimensions and maximise the expectation of box
distances in f2. f2 approximates the effect of directly minimising
IoU by compressing box dimensions and distributing boxes more
evenly on the detected region.
Pairwise computation for obtaining IoUs and box distances could
be expensive if the output feature map contains too many boxes.
Therefore, we also propose f3 as a more efficient loss function.
f3 only minimises the expectation of box dimensions instead of
directly minimising the expectation of the IoUs. Minimising f3
leads to smaller bounding boxes. When the boxes become small
enough, there will be no intersection between the boxes. In other
words, the IoUs between the boxes will be suppressed to zero. As a
consequence, the boxes can avoid being filtered by NMS.
3.4 Ensemble of substitutes
In this section, we design a loss function that converts black-box
attacks into white-box ones by observing the current OD tasks
(q.v. Section 2.2). Transferability of adversarial examples is usu-
ally considered as a pathway for launching black-box attacks. The
transferability of misclassification adversarial examples has been
investigated in [20]. However, instead of causing misclassification,
our attack takes a different attacking purpose (i.e. disabling NMS).
It is difficult to transfer Daedalus examples between OD models
with different backbones since the feature maps extracted by the
backbones are highly divergent. Herein, we take another pathway
to attack black-box models in the fields of OD.
To launch a black-box attack using Daedalus, we suggest using
an ensemble of popular OD models as the substitute to generate
adversarial examples. This is largely based on the observed fact
that current OD tasks tend to reuse few popular OD models with
pre-trained backbones. As a consequence, the generated adversarial
examples can be effective against all the popular models. Such a
universal adversarial example has a high chance to break NMS of a
black-box model. To find such an example, we can optimise a loss
function as an expectation over OD models:
f = E
m∼M f
m , (9)
herein, M is a set of OD models with popular backbones, which
includes the popular OD models and backbones. fm is the loss
value of them-th model inM , calculated based on one of Equations
6,7, and 8.
3.5 Daedalus attack against NMS
In this section, we assemble the above methods to form Daedalus
attack. Actually, our attack can be applied to all FCN-based de-
tectors. FCN-based detectors output the detected box dimension,
box position and classification probabilities in a fully differentiable,
end-to-end manner. Therefore, our attack can compute end-to-end
adversarial gradients and optimise adversarial examples for FCN-
based detectors.
Algorithm 2: L2 Daedalus attack
Input: x , Λ, γ , binary_steps , η,max_iteration, cmax , cmin
Initialisation:
c ← 10
lossinit ← f (x )
δ ← 0
x ∗ ← x + δ
for n starts from 0 to binary_steps do
for i starts from 0 tomax_iteration do
select boxes in Λ to calculate loss f (x ∗)
δ ← δ − η ▽δ [ ∥δ ∥ + c · f (x ∗)]
x ∗ ← x ∗ + δ
x ′ ← the best x ∗ found.
if f (x ∗) <= lossinit · (1 − γ ) then
cmax =min(c, cmax )
c ← 0.5 · (cmax + cmin )
else
cmin =max (c, cmin )
c ← 0.5 · (cmax + cmin )
Output: Adversarial example x ′.
Given an OD task with an image x as an input, we are going to
maximise the number of bounding box output from NMS. As an
example, YOLO-v3 outputs three feature maps that are in different
scales. The three feature maps are concatenated into one final fea-
ture map. The details of the YOLO-v3 feature map are discussed in
Section 2.3. We add a transformation layer after the feature map to
obtain the final detection results. The transformation layer applies
sigmoid transformations on the tx and ty in the feature map to
get box centre coordinates bx and by . Exponential transformations
are applied on tw and th to obtain box width bw and box height
bh , respectively. We then calculate the values of the loss functions
defined in Section 3.3 and Section 3.4. Next, we minimise the loss
value together with the distortion to generate our adversarial ex-
amples. During the optimisation, we introduce a hyper-parameter
γ to control the strength of the attack.
We proposed our attack based on two distortion metrics, namely
L2-norm and L0-norm. Herein, an Lp -norm is defined as Lp =
5
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Algorithm 3: L0 Daedalus attack
Input: x , Λ, γ , binary_steps , η,max_iteration, cmax , cmin
Initialisation:
c ← 10
lossinit ← f (x )
δ ← 0
x ∗ ← x + δ
for n starts from 0 to binary_steps do
for i starts from 0 tomax_iteration do
select boxes in Λ to calculate loss f (x ∗)
λ = argmaxλ∈δ ▽δ [ ∥δ ∥ + c · f (x ∗)]
δ ← δ − η ▽λ [ ∥δ ∥ + c · f (x ∗)]
x ∗ ← x ∗ + δ
x ′ ← the best x ∗ found.
if f (x ∗) <= lossinit · (1 − γ ) then
cmax =min(c, cmax )
c ← 0.5 · (cmax + cmin )
else
cmin =max (c, cmin )
c ← 0.5 · (cmax + cmin )
Output: Adversarial example x ′.
(∑ni |δi |p ) 1p , where δi is the perturbation on the i-th pixel. There-
fore, L2-norm attack limits the perturbations added on all the pixels,
while L0-norm attack limits the total number of pixels to be altered.
We develop these two versions of attack to study the effective-
ness of all-pixel perturbation and selective-pixel perturbation while
generating Daedalus adversarial examples.
For the L2 Daedalus attack, we can directly minimise Equa-
tion 4. However, in L0 Daedalus attack, since L0-norm is a non-
differentiable metric, we alternatively select the pixels that have
the highest adversarial gradients to perturb in each iteration, and
then we clip other gradients to be 0. The detailed algorithm of L2
Daedalus attack is presented in Algorithm 2, and the L0 Daedalus
attack is presented in Algorithm 3. Notice that Daedalus requires
only the box parameters to launch the attack. This means that our
attack can be applied to detection models that output feature maps
which contain the geometry information of bounding boxes, even
if they use different backbone networks.
4 EVALUATION
We carried out extensive experiments to evaluate the performance
of our attack. We run our experiments on a machine with four RTX
2080ti GPUs and 128G of memory. The code of Daedalus attack is
available on Github2.
4.1 Experiment settings
In our evaluations, we pick YOLO-v3 as the model to attack. We first
select the best loss function, and then we quantify the performance
of our attack based on YOLO-v3 with NMS. We use YOLO-v3 as
the substitute to generate 416 × 416 adversarial perturbations in
our experiments. During the binary search to find the best constant
c in our optimisation algorithm, we set the maximum number of
search steps to 5.
We make adversarial examples of images in the COCO 2017val
dataset [31]. We generate those using both our L0 and L2 attacks.
For each attack, first, to investigate the effectiveness of different
confidence values (γ ), we sweep γ from 0.1 to 0.9 and select 10
2Anonymised for double-blind review.
COCO examples to perturb under each γ . Second, we randomly
select 100 COCO examples to perturb under both a low (0.3) and
a high (0.7) value for γ . To unify the results in our evaluation,
we include all 80 object categories of COCO dataset in the object
category set Λ to be attacked. We also select the categories of
’person’ and ’car’ to attack. The results are shown in the appendix.
To prove that our approach can be applied on other detectors,
we also demonstrate the results of attack to RetinaNet-ResNet-50.
RetinaNet-ResNet-50 uses ResNet-50 [21] as the backbone. The
backbone differs from that of YOLO-v3. The output feature map is
different as well. In this way, we demonstrate that our Daedalus
adversarial examples can attack detectors with different backbone
structures. Moreover, we study our attack in black-box scenarios by
using an ensemble of substitutes to craft robust adversarial examples.
The visualisations of the detection results are presented in the
appendix.
4.2 Loss function selection
We propose three adversarial loss functions to craft adversarial
examples (Equations 6, 7, and 8). We compare these three and select
the best one in this section.We select 10 random images fromCOCO
dataset. With each function, we generate adversarial examples of
these 10 images. We record the runtime per example and the volatile
GPU utilisation of each loss functions. Wemeasure the performance
of each function by looking at the success rate of finding adversarial
examples at different confidences. Since our L0 attack essentially
has the same optimisation process as L2 does, we only run L2 attack
for the comparison purpose. The results are reported in Table 2.
The recorded runtime is averaged over the runtime of generating
all examples under the same loss function. The GPU utilisation is
also averaged over all examples. We use only one GPU to generate
an adversarial example in this section. It can be observed that f3 (i.e.
Equation 8) has the best success rate of finding adversarial examples
under different γ values. Moreover, f3 has the lowest runtime as
well as the lowest GPU utilisation compared to f1 and f2.
Based on the comparisons, we select f3, which is simple yet
effective, as the loss function for Daedalus attack. We continue eval-
uating Daedalus attack in the following sections with f3 (Equation
8).
4.3 Quantitative performance
In this section, we evaluate our attack from two perspectives. First,
we evaluate how Daedalus attack performs under different NMS
thresholds. Second, we investigate how the attack confidence level
(γ ) affects detection results. We assess the performance of our ad-
versarial example on a YOLO-v3 detector. Herein, we quantify the
attack performance based on three metrics: False Positive (FP ) rate,
mean Average Precision (mAP ), and distortion of the example.
First, to investigate the effect of NMS threshold on our attack,
we obtain the detection results of each adversarial/benign example
under a series of NMS thresholds, which range between 0.5 and
0.95. Second, to assess the effect of confidence value (γ ) on attack
performance, we craft adversarial examples for confidences from
0.1 to 0.9.
False positive rate. To quantify the performance of our attack, we
use the False Positive (FP ) rate as an indicator. FP rate is defined as
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Table 2: Loss function comparison
Loss Function Metric Value of γ0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
f1
Runtime 2375.62 s
GPU-Util 79%
Success rate 100% 100% 100% 90% 40% 40% 20% 0% 0%
f2
Runtime 1548.57 s
GPU-Util 77%
Success rate 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 90% 40% 20% 0%
f3
Runtime 1337.06 s
GPU-Util 73%
Success rate 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 70% 40% 40%
Figure 3: The false positive rate at IoU threshold of 0.5 with
respect to NMS threshold and confidence of attack. TheNMS
threshold ranges from 0.5 to 0.95. The confidence ranges
from 0.1 to 0.9 in L2 attack, 0.1 to 0.8 in L0 attack.
the ratio of false positive detection boxes with respect to the total
number of detection boxes. FP rate can be defined as below:
FP rate =
Nϕ + 1
N + 1 , (10)
wherein Nϕ is the number of false positive detection boxes, and N
is the total number of bounding boxes found by the model. We add
1 to both the numerator and the denominator to avoid ill definition
when there is no detected box. FP rate measures the proportion of
redundant boxes that are not filtered by NMS. FP is maximally 1
and that is when there is no correct detection result. A higher value
of FP indicates a higher success rate for the attack.
We vary IoU threshold in NMS from 0.5 to 0.95 with steps of
0.05 to obtain detection outputs under different thresholds. We
then obtain the detection results of Daedalus examples made under
confidences from 0.1 to 0.9 (0.1 to 0.8 for L0 since it cannot find
examples with 0.9 confidence). This is because L0 cannot further
discard perturbations from L2 examples under a high γ . We have
reported the FP rates in the results based on IoU thresholds of 0.5
and 0.75 in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, respectively. Each FP rate is averaged
over 10 Daedalus examples. Next, we measure the average FP rate
of 100 examples crafted under a confidence value of 0.3/0.7. We
plot the trends of the average FP rate at IoU thresholds of 0.5 and
0.75 with respect to NMS threshold in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, respectively.
It can be observed that both L0 and L2 attacks achieve FP rates of
at least 90% under different NMS thresholds, even with the lowest
attack confidence of 0.1. Increasing the NMS threshold slightly
Figure 4: The false positive rate at IoU threshold of 0.75 with
respect to NMS threshold and confidence of attack. TheNMS
threshold ranges from 0.5 to 0.95. The confidence ranges
from 0.1 to 0.9 in L2 attack, 0.1 to 0.8 in L0 attack.
Figure 5: L0 attack false positive rate at IoU threshold of 0.5
with respect toNMS threshold. Each FP rate is averaged from
the detection results of 100 Daedalus examples.
reduces the FP rate of low-confidence attacks. However, changing
the NMS threshold barely has an impact on the performance of high-
confidence attacks. FP rate increases with the increase of attack
confidence i.e. γ . It can get as high as 99.9% for a high-confidence
Daedalus attack, even with a stricter NMS threshold.
Mean average precision.With this criterion, we want to investi-
gate how our adversarial example changesmAP of the detection
results.mAP is commonly used to evaluate the performance of OD
model. It averages the Average Precisions (APs) over all detected
object categories. This metric is defined as follows:
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Figure 6: L0 attack false positive rate at IoU threshold of 0.75
with respect toNMS threshold. Each FP rate is averaged from
the detection results of 100 Daedalus examples.
Adversarial
BenignBenign
Adversarial
Figure 7:mAP IoU=.50 of Daedalus example detection results
with respect to NMS threshold and attack confidence. The
threshold ranges from 0.5 to 0.95.
%HQLJQ %HQLJQ
$GYHUVDULDO $GYHUVDULDO
Figure 8:mAP IoU=.75 of Daedalus example detection results
with respect to NMS threshold and attack confidence. The
threshold ranges from 0.5 to 0.95.
mAP =
1
M
M∑
i=1
APi , (11)
in whichM is the number of object categories. We adopted the all-
point interpolation AP from Pascal VOC challenge [11] to calculate
mAP .
Figure 9:mAP IoU=.50 of L0 and L2 Daedalus attacks with re-
spect to NMS threshold. The threshold ranges from 0.5 to
0.95. Each mAP is averaged from the detection results of 100
Daedalus examples.
Figure 10:mAP IoU=.75 of L0 and L2 Daedalus attacks with re-
spect to NMS threshold. The threshold ranges from 0.5 to
0.95. Each mAP is averaged from the detection results of 100
Daedalus examples.
We use the recommended COCO evaluationmetricsmAP IoU=.50
andmAP IoU=.75, which are themAP values calculated at IoU thresh-
olds of 0.5 and 0.75, respectively, to measure the detection preci-
sions on benign examples and Daedalus examples. Fig. 7 and Fig.
8 show themAP values of the detection results when we change
the NMS threshold and γ . We also plotted the averagemAP IoU=.50
andmAP IoU=.75 for 100 examples made under confidence values
of 0.3 and 0.7 in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10, respectively.
Based on the results, both L0 and L2 attacks decreasemAP of
the detector from 45% ∼ 59% to a value between 0% to 17.8%.mAP
drops to 0% when the confidence of the attack surpasses 0.2.
Distortion of the examples. We evaluate the distortion of the
Daedalus adversarial examples crafted based on L2-norm and L0-
norm. For a fair comparison, the distortions are measured using
L2-norm. We record the maximum, the minimum and the average
distortion of 10 adversarial examples for each attack confidence
value. The results are summarised in Table 3. It can be seen that the
distortion in adversarial examples has a positive correlation with
the confidence of attacks. The distortion increases slowly before
the confidence reaches 0.6. Once the confidence goes beyond 0.6,
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there is a rapid increase in the distortion amount. Additionally,
compared to L2 attack, L0 can not find any adversarial examples at
a confidence of 0.9.
Based on the evaluation, both L0 and L2 attacks require moderate
distortions to make low-confidence examples. Compared to L0, L2
attack introduces less distortion when the confidence is between
0.2 and 0.7, and it is slightly better in terms of finding adversarial
examples with a confidence of 0.9. However, L0 attack can reduce
the distortion when the confidence goes above 0.8. It is known that
FCN-based object detectors usually segment the input image by
a mesh grid. Each grid cell has its own responsibility for detect-
ing objects. Low-level perturbation based on L0-norm may leave
some of the grid cells unperturbed. Therefore, these cells can still
output normal detection results, which can be filtered by NMS. As
a result, L0 attack tries to perturb most of the pixels to generate
a well-qualified adversarial example, which implies having high
distortions in the example. High-level perturbation is imposed on
each pixel when the confidence goes above 0.8. However, our L0
attack can discard the perturbation on some pixels to reduce the
overall distortion.
5 ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED ATTACK
In this section, we first investigate whether our attack can be ex-
tended to a variation of NMS algorithm, namely soft-NMS [3] or
not. Second, we demonstrate the universality of Daedalus attack by
applying it to attack RetinaNet-Resnet-50. Third, we propose using
an ensemble of substitutes to create robust Daedalus examples that
can attack multiple object detectors. The proposed ensemble attack
makes Daedalus examples transferable so that they can be used in
black-box scenarios. Finally, we discuss the problem of defending
against Daedalus attack.
5.1 Breaking Soft-NMS
In addition to breaking NMS, we test our attack on soft-NMS, which
iteratively decreases the confidence score of overlapping boxes in-
stead of discarding them [3]. Soft-NMS has linear and Gaussian
versions. We apply our attack on both to investigate whether soft-
NMS can handle it or not. We randomly select one of L0 or L2
Daedalus examples to attack a soft-NMS-equipped YOLO-v3 detec-
tor. The detection results for L0 adversarial examples are displayed
in Fig. 11a. For L2 adversarial examples, the detection results are
similarly illustrated in Fig. 11b. From the results one can find that
both L0 and L2 can break linear soft-NMS as well as Gaussian
soft-NMS.
We also measure the FP rate of our attack for soft-NMS. The
results are shown in Fig. 12. Our L0 adversarial examples which are
made with different confidence values result in a FP rate of 100%.
Our L2 attack also leads to 100% FP rate when the attack confidence
is above 0.2.
5.2 Attacking RetinaNet
Daedalus attack can be applied to different FCN-based detection
algorithms. To demonstrate this capability, we launch it against
another popular OD algorithm, RetinaNet [30]. By default, we se-
lect ResNet-50 as the backbone network of RetinaNet. RetinaNet
extracts the feature maps of detection boxes and object classes by
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Figure 11: (a) L0 Daedalus attack against soft-NMS. The top
left image is an L0 Daedalus example crafted under a confi-
dence of 0.3. The top right one shows the detection results
from NMS, as a reference. The left bottom one shows the re-
sults of linear soft-NMS, and the right bottom one shows the
results of Gaussian soft-NMS. (b) L2 Daedalus attack against
soft-NMS. The top left image is an L2 Daedalus example
crafted under a confidence of 0.3. The top right one shows
the detection results from NMS, as a reference. The left bot-
tom one shows the results of linear soft-NMS, and the right
bottom one shows the results of Gaussian soft-NMS.
Figure 12: The FP rate of Daedalus attack against YOLO-v3
with soft-NMS. We evaluated the FP rate at IoU thresholds
of 0.5 and 0.75.
using a feature pyramid network (FPN) [29]. The features will then
be processed by regression models to obtain the position and the
dimension of the bounding boxes. The object classification results
will be obtained from the feature maps by classification models.
We follow the same procedure for attacking RetinaNet as we did
for YOLO-v3. We calculate the adversarial loss based on Equation
8, and generate adversarial examples by optimising Equation 4. We
only test our L2 attack since a successful L2 attack guarantees a
successful L0 attack, according to the structure of the attacks. We
generate ten 416 × 416 adversarial examples under a confidence of
0.3. We plot one of the detection results from RetinaNet in Fig. 13.
It can be seen that the example triggers malfunctioning of NMS in
RetinaNet, and it leads to extremely dense detection results.
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Table 3: Distortions under different confidences
Attack Distortion Value of γ0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
L2 Daedalus
Maximum 157.49 259.25 113.24 324.53 598.45 4138.47 5915.90 25859.67 19553.05
Average 130.59 218.86 96.51 166.27 344.75 1670.35 1835.04 9953.59 14390.76
Minimum 94.30 175.07 75.24 95.30 185.25 351.55 366.49 210.24 11894.38
L0 Daedalus
Maximum 162.74 513.54 555.11 1200.48 1001.86 42144.96 3891.80 3364.29 N/A
Average 87.81 346.71 440.21 651.77 736.40 12765.82 1992.30 1501.58 N/A
Minimum 53.26 165.50 339.44 402.48 436.15 3713.67 729.38 848.36 N/A
Benign Detection results 
Adversarial Detection results
Figure 13: The detection results of a Daedalus adversarial
example made by our L2 attack towards RetinaNet-ResNet-
50.
We also measure the FP rate and themAP value of RetinaNet for
the 10 Daedalus examples. The FP rate with respect to NMS thresh-
old is plotted in Fig. 14, andmAP with respect to NMS threshold
is plotted in Fig. 15. More detection results of Daedalus examples
from RetinaNet are presented in the appendix.
Fig. 14 shows that Daedalus attack can increase the FP rate
of RetinaNet to 99%. According to Fig. 15, our attack decreases
mAP IoU=.50 of RetinaNet from around 0.27 to below 0.05 and also
mAP IoU=.75 to 0. Therefore, our attack is effective against Reti-
naNet.
5.3 Making universal adversarial examples
Based on the census in Section 1, we take three popular models,
namely YOLO-v3, SSD, and RetinaNet, to verify the idea of ensemble
attack. We do not introduce more models as substitutes, simply due
to the limited GPU memory. According to Table 1, a universal
Daedalus example for YOLO-v3, SSD, and RetinaNet can already
break 54.9% of the 1,696 repositories. We investigate whether a
universal Daedalus example can be found to break all the models.
In our experiments, YOLO-v3 employs Darknet-53 as its backbone
network. RetinaNet and SSD have different backbone networks and
use ResNet-50 and VGG-16, respectively. Since the three models
Figure 14: FP rate IoU=.50 and FP rate IoU=.75 of our L2
Daedalus attack against RetinaNet, with respect to NMS
threshold. The NMS threshold ranges from 0.5 to 0.95.
Figure 15:mAP IoU=.50 andmAP IoU=.75 of our L2 Daedalus at-
tacks against RetinaNet, with respect to NMS threshold. The
threshold ranges from 0.5 to 0.95.
are backed by different backbones, they generate divergent feature
maps.
The detection results of the adversarial example are displayed
in Fig.16. We can observe that the adversarial example can trigger
NMS malfunctioning for all the models. The detection results for
more adversarial examples crafted using ensemble of substitutes can
be found in the appendix of this paper. Furthermore, when there
is a large number of OD models in the ensemble, an attacker may
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Figure 16: The detection results of a Daedalus adversarial
example made by ensemble-of-substitutes approach. We de-
tect the adversarial example using YOLO-v3, RetinaNet, and
SSD. The first row contains a benign example and its detec-
tion results. The second row contains an adversarial exam-
ple and the detection results of the adversarial example.
adopt methods such as [51] to find proper coefficient for each term
in the loss function to enhance attack performance.
5.4 Adaptive defences against Daedalus attack
Daedalus minimises detection boxes to trigger a NMS malfunc-
tion. Henceforth, a straight forward defence might be limiting the
minimal allowed detection box size during NMS (i.e. NMS defence).
To investigate this possible defence, we first study the outputs
of YOLO-v3 given 100 benign examples and corresponding 100
Daedalus examples. We visualise the distribution of the detection
box dimension in Figure 17. According to Figure 17, we select an
empirical threshold of 103.62 to filter adversarial boxes from de-
tected boxes during NMS. Given this defence, we again evaluate
the FP rate and the mAP of YOLO-v3 on 10 Daedalus examples. The
evaluation results are plotted in Figure 18. According to the results,
NMS defence is not an effective defence.
A second adaptive defence might be MagNet [40]. We train an
denoise autoencoder to reform Daedalus examples back to benign
ones, and measure the reconstruction error to detect strong per-
turbations. Therefore, the evaluation of the defence is two-fold:
1) Whether the defence can increase mAP and reduce FP rate via
reforming an adversarial example. 2) Whether the reconstruction
error can be detected when an adversarial example cannot be turned
into a benign one. To answer these two questions, we evaluate the
FP rate, the mAP and the Mean Squared Error (MSE) between a
Daedalus example and a reformed example (i.e., the reconstruction
error) of a defended YOLO-v3 model. The results are plotted in
Figure 19. According to the evaluation results, first, reforming the
adversarial examples can barely increase the performance of the
detection model. Second, The reconstruction error increases only
after the confidence of the attack reaches 0.5, which means it is diffi-
cult to detect attacks with confidence levels below 0.5. Interestingly,
we observe that the detected objects in an image reformed by a
denoise autoencoder cannot retain proper positions and categories.
This makes the defence inviable.
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Figure 17: Distributions of bounding box dimension from
detection results of YOLO-v3. The distributions are based
on detection results of 100 COCO images and correspond-
ing 100 adversarial examples, respectively. In total, there are
812 boxes in the benign results and 286,469 adversarial boxes
in the adversarial results. As a defence, we discarded boxes
whose dimension is below 103.62 during NMS.
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Figure 18: The FP-rate and the mAP of YOLO-v3 with NMS
defence. The defence barely changes the FP-rate and the
mAP.
5.5 Discussion of Daedalus attack
Adversarial examples were initially made for machine learning
classifiers. Hence, current defense methods mainly focus on the
classification task. Defence mechanisms can be either reactive (e.g.
[17, 34, 38, 40, 41, 55, 59]), or proactive (e.g. [7, 8, 19, 37, 39, 45,
53, 56, 57]). In the majority of reactive defense systems, a second
model is used to detect examples with adversarial perturbation.
In the category of proactive defence, the model is trained to be as
robust to adversarial examples as possible. Currently, there exists no
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Figure 19: The FP-rate and themAPof YOLO-v3withMagNet
defence. Reforming Daedalus examples by an autoencoder
can slightly increase the performance of YOLO-v3. However,
the FP-rate@.50 still stays above 0.6 while the FP-rate@.75
stays above 0.7. The mAP@.50 remains below 0.45 while
the mAP@.75 remains below 0.3. Furthermore, the model
performance drops when the confidence of the attack goes
above 0.7.
defense method for the new type of attack introduced by Daedalus
examples.
Daedalus attack poses an intimidating threat to OD tasks. Cur-
rent machine learning applications, especially those that need OD,
are developed by reusing existing models [26]. Therefore, an adver-
sary can adopt an ensemble of substitutes to launch the attack under
black-box setting. He/she only needs to include popular backbone
networks in the ensemble of substitutes. Alternatively, an adversary
can guess the type of the backbone network being used and then
launch the attack. Moreover, it is possible to combine Daedalus with
attacks such as Expectation over Transformation [2] to produce
robust physical adversarial examples. This will further augment
the viability of the attack vector.
As revealed by our attack, NMS is no longer a secure solution
for OD. Unlike the attacks against classifiers, Daedalus attack com-
presses the box dimension values in the feature map to undermine
the NMS functionality. Currently, there is no intact defence for
such attack. However, defences for DNN classifiers cannot be di-
rectly applied to OD algorithms to tackle Daedalus attack, which is
supported by our evaluation in Section 5.4. This dilemma makes
defending against Daedalus an urgent task. We may need to pro-
pose new algorithms to filter redundant bounding boxes for OD
tasks if no effective defence is found against Daedalus attack.
6 RELATEDWORK
Methods for crafting adversarial examples againstmachine-learning-
based classifiers have been extensively studied. The algorithms for
generating such examples can be divided into gradient-based and
forward derivative-based. The former type of attacks finds adver-
sarial examples by minimising the cost of an adversarial objective
set by the attacker, based on gradient descent. For example, L-BFGS
was adopted to optimise the adversarial objective functions to gen-
erate adversarial examples [5, 56]. Fast gradient sign method was
proposed to rapidly find first-order Taylor polynomial approxima-
tions of adversarial examples based on gradient descent or gradient
sign descent [16]. Basic iterative method relies on multiple steps
of gradient descent to generate adversarial examples [28]. Deep-
fool computes adversarial gradients based on the local linearity
of neural networks [42]. Forward derivative based attack perturbs
salient features based on the Jacobian between the model inputs and
outputs [44]. Based on these algorithms, there are evolved attacks
that use different distortion metrics to make adversarial examples
more imperceptible to human eyes [10, 25]. Furthermore, there are
methods to craft adversarial examples of data that have discrete
features (e.g. text) [9, 18, 27].
Beyond the above attacks, some methods can generate robust
adversarial examples that can fool real-world classifiers and detec-
tors. For example, dense adversarial generation (DAG) algorithm
was proposed to create adversarial examples for OD and segmenta-
tion [58]. Lu et al. crafted robust adversarial examples that caused
misclassification in object detector [35]. RP2 was proposed to craft
adversarial example of real-world road signs [12]. Later, RP2 was
extended to attack YOLO-v2 [54]. Recently, expectation over trans-
formation (EoT) algorithm has been proposed to synthesise robust
adversarial examples [2, 4]. However, current adversarial exam-
ples only focus on triggering misclassification in machine learning
classifiers/object detectors. Our Daedalus attack creates adversarial
examples that causes malfunctioning of NMS, which is different
from all the previous attacks in nature.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel type of adversarial example which
aims at disabling NMS functionality in object detection models. The
proposed attack, named Daedalus, can control both the strength
of the generated adversarial examples and the object class to be
attacked. The attacked model will output extremely noisy detec-
tion results such that it is no longer functional. Our attack can
reduce the mAP of detection to nearly 0%. The false positive rate
for Daedalus examples can go up to 99.9%. Meanwhile, the required
distortion to launch Daedalus attack is imperceptible. This attack
aims at breaking NMS instead of causing misclassifications. Unlike
misclassification-targeting adversarial examples, it is difficult to
defend against such attack since the attacked feature map is much
more complicated than the classification logits. Transferability of
Daedalus attack is affected by the selected substitutes. We rely on
minimising the expectation of box dimensions over a set of feature
maps to make robust examples, which can make NMS malfunction
in multiple detection models. There are some remaining problems
we aim to address in future. For example, considering the complex-
ity of OD feature maps, it is difficult to make universal adversarial
examples that can launch zero-knowledge attacks. Daedalus attack
reveals a vulnerability lies in object detection algorithms, which can
have fatal consequences in the real world. Nevertheless, defending
method against Daedalus attack is still a missing piece. We will also
try to address this problem in our future work.
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APPENDIX A: DEMONSTRATION
We include more results of Daedalus attack in this appendix.
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Figure 20: Adversarial examples made by our L0 attack. The first row contains the original images. The third row contains our
low-confidence (γ = 0.3) adversarial examples. The fifth row contains our high-confidence (γ = 0.7) examples. The detection
results from YOLO-v3 are in the rows below them. The confidence controls the density of the redundant detection boxes in
the detection results.
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Figure 21: Adversarial examples made by our L2 attack. The first row contains the original images. The third row contains our
low-confidence (γ = 0.3) adversarial examples. The fifth row contains our high-confidence (γ = 0.7) examples. The detection
results from YOLO-v3 are in the rows below them. The confidence controls the density of the redundant detection boxes in
the detection results.
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Figure 22: The detection results of Daedalus adversarial examples made by our L2 attack towards RetinaNet-ResNet-50. The
adversarial examples are crafted based on a confidence of 0.3.
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Figure 23: The detection results ofDaedalus adversarial examplesmade by our ensemble L2 attack towards YOLO-v3, RetinaNet,
and SSD. The adversarial examples are crafted based on a confidence of 0.3. The first row displays the benign examples. The
second, the third, and the fourth rows are the detection results of the benign examples from YOLO-v3, RetinaNet, and SSD,
respectively. The Daedalus examples are displayed in the fourth row. The detection results of the adversarial examples from
YOLO-v3, RetinaNet, and SSD are in the following rows.
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Figure 24: Attacking the object category which has the most number of the detection boxes before NMS. The attacked model
is YOLO-v3.
%HQLJQ'HWHFWHG$GYHUVDULDO'HWHFWHG
Figure 25: Demonstration of attacking object in a specified category for YOLO-v3. We select ’person’ to attack.
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Figure 26: Demonstration of attacking object in a specified category for YOLO-v3. We select ’car’ to attack.
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